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Practical Rationality at Work – A New  
Argumentation Model
João Sàágua and Michael D. Baumtrog
Introduction
Conceptual ideals typically provide unobtainable standards from which 
to measure and evaluate the real. In philosophy, ideals are often concep-
tualized and articulated not with the intent of literally dictating practice, 
but with the hope of providing norms from which reflective evaluation 
might lead to improved practice. Such is the case with any ideal model 
of reasoning or argumentation. No philosophy working with ideal rea-
soning or argumentation expects real reasoners or arguers to follow the 
ideal model perfectly or always. Rather, many of the models of reason-
ing and argumentation put forward thus far serve as standards against 
which poor or fallacious practices become apparent. Thus, the ‘phil-
osophical punch’ of an ideal model is two-fold: the model itself is an 
articulation of the way things ought to be, and if correct, the way things 
ought to be informs, motivates, and justifies articulations of failures in 
practice.
In what follows we provide our first articulation of a new ideal 
model of integrated practical reasoning and argumentation. It is ideal 
in two senses. First, its method is prescriptive, although it may never be 
executed perfectly in practice. Second, as an ideal standard, applying 
it to an instance of real life reasoning or argumentation will provide 
evaluative insights (see Baumtrog 2015). However, although an ideal 
model, we have tried to keep its ideal and prescriptive aspects relevant, 
pertinent, and realistically representative of intuitions regarding what 
we actually do when we practically reason and argue.
As alluded to above, we are not the first to put forward an ideal 
model for practical reasoning or argumentation. Philosophers have long 
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focused on practical reasoning, with recent models/schemata coming 
from Broome (2002) and Audi (2006), to name but a few. Argumen-
tation scholars such as Walton (1990, 2007, 2013a, b), van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans (2002 pp.101–102),1 and Fair-
clough & Fairclough (2012) have provided recent models of practical 
argumentation. As such, if we are to be responsible academics, we must 
then justify the need for our current contribution; we must answer the 
question ‘What is on offer here that cannot be found elsewhere?’
The answer will become clearer below, but here we would like to of-
fer one brief answer explained through three supporting points. The main 
answer is that the new model is an integrated model of practical rea-
soning and argumentation. Philosopher’s working on practical reasoning 
and ethics have thus far paid little attention to argumentation theory. 
Similarly, argumentation scholars have paid little attention to the work 
of those in practical reasoning and ethical decision-making. In short, 
there is a gap between the two areas. This could be in part due to the 
explanation Walton (2007: 212) gives that there is a contrast between his 
‘commitment’ model and the ‘Belief, Desire, Intention’ (BDI) models. 
As integrative, then, we consider our model a novel contribution. 
The three supporting points indicate the main ways the model is 
integrated. The first is that it can be used by both commitment and BDI 
proponents. For those viewing the model with a mind to argumentation, 
we invite the reader to feel welcome to think in terms of commitments 
interlocutors have and can be held accountable for. Viewing the model 
as an instance of reasoning, we invite the reader to view the model in 
terms of attitudes that connect to reasons in an inferential process. In 
both cases, however, we side with the view that practical reasoning and 
argumentation conclude in an intention to act rather than, as many in 
argumentation have it, a belief that one should act. For argumentation, 
this means maintaining a discursive commitment that one intends to 
perform some act. 
The second way the model is integrative is that we reconceptualise 
and reposition what have come to be known as ‘argumentation schemes’ 
as producing pro tanto reasons. In this way, we use one concept from 
argumentation – argumentation schemes with critical questions – while 
1 They refer to their scheme as ‘pragmatic argumentation’ rather than ‘practical’.
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using them as providing support for reasons used on a BDI conception 
of the role of reasons. The importance of this move will be made clearer 
below.
The third point of integration is that we attempt to integrate explic-
it moral considerations into the production and evaluation of practical 
reasoning and argumentation. While moral components have been a 
focal point for philosophers of practical reasoning, many in argumenta-
tion have stayed away from including them on the basis that procedural 
accounts of argumentation ought to remain silent on content. As will 
be shown below, our account takes moral considerations into account, 
without, however, dictating or advocating for an authoritative moral 
theory or threshold.
Without further ado then, the next section will introduce our start-
ing points: what we take as background and assumptions from which 
to proceed. Section 3 provides an overview of the model, looking at its 
functioning on a macro scale. Section 4 zooms in on each of the model’s 
component parts, detailing and justifying the selection of the schemes 
so as to provide a picture of the scaffolding of practical reasoning. In 
section 5 we provide a summary and some concluding remarks.
1. Background and Assumptions
1.1 Background
We take up Broome’s characterization of reasoning as ‘a process where-
by some of your attitudes cause you to have a new attitude’ (Broome 
2013: 221) and agree that for practical reasoning the new attitude is an 
intention. Accordingly, in designing this model we have conceived of 
practical reasoning as an activity of the human mind aiming at forming 
an intention to complete the actions required for some alteration in the 
state of the world. 
Theoretically, we separate reasoning and argumentation – though 
recognize the two are intertwined in practice. We consider argumentation 
to turn on the notion of conflict, and thus conceive of it as a dialectical 
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situation, which can be individual, dialogical, or polylogical. It is the 
practice, through which human agents support or criticise a given line of 
reasoning, or a step of that reasoning (Baumtrog 2017). Reasoning and 
argumentation are differentiated by the nature of the activity that each one 
carries out. Reasoning is a mental and usually individual process leading 
to a conclusion. It is an activity of the mind through which an individual, 
starting from certain mental states and following a rational process ac-
cording to rules, leads his mind into a new mental state that concludes the 
process (Broome: 2004). Argumentation begins when one or more parts 
of the process of reasoning come into conflict – it is the contestation of 
reasoning or its conclusion.
In terms of practical argumentation, if the argumentation from 
an opponent is successful, the proponent can interiorize that recom-
mendation and make it his own intention. Only when someone reasons 
or argues by himself, does the argumentation immediately result in an 
intention to perform the action (or not).2 Practical reasoning and ar-
gumentation have the following purpose in common: to produce and 
serve as rational support for an intention to realize an action and/or a se-
quence of actions consisting of the means chosen to achieve that action.
1.2 Assumptions
In order to philosophically frame the model, it is first necessary to ex-
plain the main assumptions from which we start. 
A) Practical reasoning and argumentation:
(A1) Objectives are intentions. Objectives are nothing other than inten-
tions linguistically expressed and sufficiently stable to serve as the base 
for practical reasoning and practical argumentation. Since objectives 
can be more general or more specific, so too can intentions. In some 
cases, it is helpful to distinguish more precisely between an objective 
and an aim. Whereas an objective can be achieved through a traceable 
2 Thanks to Dima Mohammed for this suggestion.
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causal sequence, an aim is a broader objective such as ‘being a good 
person’, which may not be as easily traceable. Since both are intentions 
we consider them both objectives. However, for clarity, we try to use the 
word ‘aim’ where it applies and is helpful to clarify.3 In what follows, 
and for formal simplicity, we shall use ‘G’ (or variants) to refer to the 
common content of the intention or the objective.
(A2) Complex objectives give rise to plans. When a certain objec-
tive assumed by x is sufficiently complex and for that reason involves 
a progressive execution over time, it gives rise to a plan. Plans, among 
other things, influence our actions beyond the present (Bratman, 1987). 
In what follows, we shall use ‘M’ (or variants) to refer to the content of 
any means or sequence of means, whether they belong to a plan over 
time or to simpler practical reasoning.
(A3) The relation between Objective and Mean is contextual. The 
first objective of a plan can be a means for another, more inclusive, plan. 
It should also be noted that, for example, x can have as an objective ‘to 
be in a place of power’ and use the sub-plan ‘to be Prime-Minister’ as a 
means (and that other means/sub-plans would eventually also be needed). 
Hence, it becomes apparent that being a means and an objective (end) of-
ten depends on context and can be conceived of differently depending on 
the level of zoom with which the reasoning or argumentation is viewed.
B) Human Agents
(B1) The relation ‘is a reason for’ is considered primitive and pro tan-
to. To justify their objectives and the means they choose for realizing 
them, human agents reason and argue in terms of reasons. At this point 
we will not go beyond the intuitive notion of ‘a reason’ that Thomas 
Scanlon articulates: ‘a consideration that counts in favour’ (Scanlon, 
1998, p. 17). For example, that ‘x is thirsty’ is a reason (a consideration 
that counts in favour) for x to (intend to) drink water. Along with Dancy 
(2004) we recognize that reasons may count in favour of and/or against 
 
3 Many thanks to David Hitchcock for bringing the difference between goals and 
aims to our attention. We acknowledge that further work is needed regarding how 
this might impact our view of practical reasoning and argumentation overall. 
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the assumption of an objective and we are therefore talking about con-
tributing reasons or reasons pro tanto.4 In what follows, if we wish to 
distinguish between reasons, we will number them as R1, R2, and so on. 
To qualify reasons, we will write R+ or R-, depending on whether these 
contribute in a positive or negative way, respectively, for the assumption 
of an objective, G (or for the adoption of a mean, M). Taking this no-
tation a little further, we will accept that (R±1, …, R±n)G* represents 
the set of reasons, positive or negative, associated to the assumption of 
an objective G* where the asterisk identifies that the goal has yet to be 
assumed and that (R±1, …, R±n)M* represents the set of reasons, pos-
itive or negative, associated to the adoption of a mean or set of means 
which have yet to be assumed. Accordingly, and in short, G* is used to 
stand for ‘proposed goal’ and M* is used to stand for ‘proposed means.’
(B2) Situation, Circumstance, and Context. We can describe prac-
tical reasoning and argumentation in relation to the baseline situation, 
S’, and to a situation of arrival, S*, also called a future state of affairs 
(Hitchcock, 2011; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012): x is in situation S’, 
S’ has some aspect that leaves x unsatisfied, let us call that aspect ‘the 
absence of G*’, and x assumes G* as an objective, whose realization 
will turn S’ into S*. x thinks that to realize G*, he should mobilize the 
means M*. The beliefs and evaluations the agent(s) hold about a given 
situation determine what is relevant for a given occurrence of practical 
reasoning or argumentation. Accordingly, we call the context of practi-
cal reasoning and argumentation the set of relevant circumstances.
(B3) Plausible Justifications and Defeasible Rules. Given that in-
compatibilities exist between objectives, means for objectives, and the 
means for one objective impacting a different objective, etc., combined 
with the ever evolving (perceived) knowledge of the agent, it follows 
that the rules the agents can use to infer a certain conclusion from cer-
tain premises are rules of plausible inference and, therefore, remain de-
feasible and sensitive to context.5 Although they are never deductive or 
inductive (or statistical) inferences (even if these enter as components 
 
4 The literature on reasons is vast and very complex. Some of our favourite texts are 
(in alphabetical order) Broome (2001, 2004), Dancy (2004), and Scanlon (1998).
5 As convincingly argued by Walton, Reed, & Macagno (2008). Along the same 
lines, though more moral, see Dancy (2004: 111–117, 184–187).
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of plausible inferences), plausible justifications and defeasible rules 
should not be seen as a defect or limitation, but rather the condition of 
the exercise of practical reasoning and argumentation.
With this background and these assumptions in mind, we now 
move to our view of practical reasoning and argumentation illustrated 
through a flowchart and accompanying explanation. 
Overview of the New Model
Figure 1: Integrated Model for Practical Reasoning and Argumentation.6\
6 Thanks to Jacky Visser for suggestions on improving the visual layout of the model.
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Our model is an integrative, realistic,7 and normative model. In a sin-
gle representation, our model integrates the structure of both practical 
reasoning and practical argumentation, including the variants usually 
differentiated in both – i.e., instrumental, normative, and value based. It 
is realistic in the sense that following the model generally corresponds 
to the real practice of reasoners and arguers. It is normative in the sense 
that it prescribes a chain of inferences (for reasoning) or a chain of 
primitive argumentative schemes (for argumentation) that should occur, 
and in a certain order, for both to provide maximally plausible formula-
tions, conclusions, and decisions.
3.1 Stages and Topics
The model has 5 Stages. Stage one addresses the agent’s motivation for 
action; Stage two is concerned with the proposed goal and other goals; 
Stage three concerns the available means for achieving the proposed 
goal; Stage four deals with the relation between the means and between 
the means and other goals; and Stage five is the decision to act, not act, 
or make a modification to the reasoning or argumentation and start the 
process over. Given that our model is integrative and that, simultane-
ously, we think that the assumption of the objectives themselves should 
be an object of reasoning and argumentation – and not only the choice 
of means – our model includes two initial stages about objectives, two 
about means, and one for the decision.
In order to license moving from one Stage to the next, the reasoner 
must answer one or two ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ Topic questions. In any case, an 
affirmative answer results in a ‘green light’ to move to the next Stage. In 
some cases, a negative answer or ‘red light’ will lead to another Topic 
question and thus a second chance to move to the next Stage. In other 
cases, a negative answer leads straight to a conclusion not to act.
Each Topic questions an aspect of the general theme of the Stage 
and conditions the specific practical reasoning and argumentation asso-
ciated with it. Ideally, the answer should be properly justified through 
 
7 Thanks to Eugen Poppa for this term.
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an instantiation of one or more primitive argumentation schemes (AS), 
together with responses to their respective critical questions (CQ). 
These together determine the basic argumentation structure of the Top-
ic. Discussing (arguing about) those primitive argumentative schemes 
may require (several) other argumentation schemes.8 It is not possible 
to anticipate which schemes those might be, given that they can vary 
from case to case. We can thus only provide a complete string of what 
we believe to be primitive schemes.
3.2 Tracks
Given the possibility of providing differing answers to the Topic ques-
tions, there are different paths or tracks one can take through the model. 
The ‘fast track’ (shortest path)9 most readily resembles routine reasoning 
and involves only ‘Yes’ answers to the Topic questions. In such a case the 
arguer only addresses Topics 1, 2, 4, and 6. In the most involved cases, 
the arguer has to address all of the Topics – weighing the reasons for and 
against the acceptance of both the goal and the means.
3.3 Schemes and Critical Questions
Many of the schemes we include in our primitive list are based on 
schemes already articulated by others, especially Walton, Reed, and 
Macagno (2008). We have, however, made efforts to systematize the 
schemes by including only one term with inferential power per premise. 
For example, the first argumentation scheme for the argument from tel-
eology includes as the first premise: x has G+ as its finality. In this case 
‘finality’ is the sole term with inferential power.
8 The distinction between primitive and derived schemes is contextual and was a 
suggestion made by Fabrizio Macagno.
9 Nothing guarantees a reasoner or arguer will be able to address the ‘short’ track 
Topics quickly or quicker than perhaps all of the long track Topics. We are mak-
ing a quantitative observation here only that fewer Topics and schemes need be 
addressed when taking this route.
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We have also adjusted the schemes and critical questions to 
strengthen them for individual use. If you have a separate, critical Other 
asking the critical questions, then the wording of the questions can be 
less stringent in light of the opportunity for the Other to ‘press harder’ – 
so to speak – if the answerer does not provide a satisfactory answer. 
In the case where you are the only one responsible for asking and an-
swering the critical questions, a more carefully worded question will 
make it harder to provide an unsatisfactory answer. As such, we find the 
wording of the questions is of great importance and have avoided using 
critical questions with only ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answers. 
Accordingly, we asked ourselves ‘what makes a critical question, 
critical?’ If you envisage the question being asked by a critical Other, 
then part of the answer would be ‘The disposition with which the ques-
tion is being asked’. When you are alone and conducting individual dia-
lectical or quasi-dialogical argumentation, however, that critical attitude 
may be nearly absent. Thus, another part of the motivation for the way 
we have formulated the critical questions was in an effort to make the 
questions themselves as critical as possible, while relying less on the 
person asking them. 
Taking the above two considerations into account – avoiding 
Yes/No questions and making the questions critical – we have de-
signed the questions as a pair of questions, the first of which asks for 
an explanation of the inferential term’s use and the second of which 
challenges it. Both parts are necessary, in our view, for the critical 
questioning of the inferential term to be adequate. Thus, in our mod-
el, the second (part of the) question ensures the question contains a 
critical component in every case and regardless of the questioner or 
their disposition.
Finally, it should also be noted that schemes may be used more than 
once to answer any given Topic question. For example, when answering 
the question in Topic one, the reasoner or arguer may put forward two 
differing reasons from positive values. In addition, they may avoid one 
of our identified schemes altogether. For example, they might not use 
any reasons from teleology. Our only contention is that at least one of the 
argumentation schemes should be used in answering any given Topic. As 
contributory, how the reasons resulting from the use of the schemes inter-
act is a separate question from which and how many schemes are used.
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3.4 Closure
Following a track and using the schemes ensures that the use of our model 
always ends in a traceably justified decision to act or not act. Whereas other 
models have left the decision to an unarticulated procedure of weighting, 
our model provides a way to rationally justify the selection of one of the 
alternatives. This is especially important for the evaluation or challenging 
of the process. On our account, the choice of which schemes to employ 
(or not), as well as the quality with which they were employed, can both 
be identified and evaluated as precise areas of challenge or critique against 
which an alternate possibility can be clearly projected.
2.  The Structure of Practical Reasoning and Practical  
Argumentation
Let us now identify the problem each Topic addresses, how this problem 
can motivate practical reasoning, and the primitive argumentative schemes 
(and respective critical questions) that should be used to justify a response.
Stage 1. Topic 1
Stage 1, containing only Topic 1, consists in answering the problem: ‘Does 
X or should X have (at least) one reason to aim at goal G*?’ It should be 
noted that a reason here does not have to be a pro-attitude. I can suppose that 
I should assume G* for another type of reason: maybe G* involves some sac-
rifice that I have to make (hence, my not having a pro-attitude towards G*), 
but, if I assume G*, perhaps I feel that I am contributing to realize a certain 
value (‘social equity’) that I cherish. We can also include here reasons deriv-
ing from ‘institutional facts’ (Searle, 1995; 2001, p. 56–7).
The rational justification of the answer to the question of Topic 1 
seems to depend on three main considerations, articulated through four 
argumentation schemes.10
10 For reasoning, consider only the pattern of reasoning without the critical questions.
António Marques and João Sàágua - 9783034330589
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/09/2018 03:08:16PM
via free access
204 João Sàágua and Michael D. Baumtrog
Teleological Considerations. Practical reasoning and argumenta-
tion are teleological in that goals are instantiations or manifestations of 
a general purpose or aim. If, for example, x is an institution created with 
the mission G+, we consider that G* can be a manifestation of G+. By 
arguing that G* results from that objective, one attributes to x a reason 
for assuming G*. To illustrate:
Major Premise:  NATO’s mission is to actively contribute to world 
peace and security (G+)
Minor Premise:  Helping Ukraine increase its defensive power (G*) 
will actively contribute to world peace and security
 Therefore, it is plausible to suppose that,
Conclusion: NATO has a reason to help Ukraine increase its defensive 
power.
More formalized we arrive at:
Argumentation Scheme 1. Assumption of Objectives  
by Teleology11
(AS1)
Premise 1: x has G+ as its finality
Premise 2: G* belongs to G+
 Therefore, plausibly
Conclusion:  There is a reason for x to assume G*
By definition, answering CQs in plausible argumentation is essentially 
contextual: it depends on the circumstances (in the sense of ‘circum-
stance’ explained above). 
Satisfactorily answering the following critical questions provides a 
plausible justification:
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 1
CQ1: How does G+ really correspond to the finality of x? 
 How can G+ not correspond to the finality of x?12
11 We agree with Fabrizio Macagno, who suggested that AS1 can be considered a vari-
ant of ‘Argument from Commitment’ (Cf. Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008: 335).
12 For this and all critical questions we assume there can be more than one response/
reason. We use the singular wording only for the sake of simplicity of presentation. 
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CQ2: How is G* really a particular case of G+?
 How could G* not be a particular case of G+?
Value Considerations. These are considerations involving moral or so-
cial values, sensu lato, regarding both individual and collective behav-
iour (e.g. ‘Individual Well-Being’, ‘Collective Well-Being’, ‘Keeping a 
Promise’, ‘Honesty’, etc.)
For this consideration, we have two types of cases in mind. The first 
regards the assumption of your value as positive (V+). For example, if 
you are a political leader who values fairness (V+), you may consider it 
to be positively promoted by taxing the rich to help fund a free national 
public health system (G*). In the second type, G* may not directly pro-
mote any obvious value. It may, however have consequences positively 
valued by x, for instance, to quench thirst, thus giving x another kind of 
reason to assume G*.
In the first case, the argumentative scheme from positive values 
(Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008, p. 321) generally applies, but with 
two caveats. First, there are no critical questions associated with the 
scheme in the literature so, using the method described above, we have 
taken the liberty of formulating them ourselves. Second, since we for-
mulated these questions to focus on the correct application, in a given 
context, of the essential term with inferential power, we will propose a 
slightly modified, simplified version of the scheme that clearly isolates 
the (only) expressions we consider essential.
Argumentation Scheme 2. Argument from Positive Values
AS2)
Premise 1: value V is positive (= V+)
Premise 2: V+ positively values G*
 Therefore, plausibly
Conclusion: There is a reason for x to assume G*
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 2
CQ1: What reasons are there for attributing a positive value to V?
 What reasons could count against attributing a positive value to V?
CQ2: What reasons are there for the positive evaluation of G* by V+?
  What reasons are there for G* not to be positively evaluated by 
V+?
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The answer to CQ1 will likely involve the participants in a substantial 
discussion regarding values. The answer to CQ2 most likely consists in 
the demonstration of the relevant relation between V+ and G*, which 
may require sub-argumentation. For instance, if V+ is ‘to promote 
peace’ and G* is ‘to reinforce military power in Ukraine’ there is defi-
nitely room for sub-argumentation.
  Argumentation Scheme 3. Argument from Positive Conse-
quences
 (AS3)
Premise 1:  If G* is realized by x, then the consequences K1, …, Kn 
will occur.
Premise 2:  K1, …, Kn are to be valued positively.
Therefore, plausibly
Conclusion:  There is a reason for x to assume G* 
We have ‘unfolded’ the single premise put forward by Walton, Reed & 
Macagno (2008, pp. 332–3; cf. Walton, 2013a, p. 102) into two premises 
to permit a critical question to specifically focus on two issues in two 
premises. This is because in the actual argumentative process it is possi-
ble to accept one of the premises and deny the other, deny both, or accept 
both. The use of the infinitive in the second premise is deliberate, for it 
allows a discussion (CQ2) on the positive evaluation: x, the proponent, 
can positively value K1, …, Kn, but in argumentation, y, the opponent, 
can value them negatively or be neutral. If we indexed the evaluation to x, 
the second premise would become undisputable (it would consist in the 
truism, stated by x, that x values K1, …, Kn positively) and we think that 
it should be able to be discussed. We have also suppressed the original 
version’s CQ3, because we think that it should be carried out in Topic 3 
(where pro and con reasons are pondered), as we shall show below.
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 3
CQ1: What makes it plausible that G* has K1, …, Kn as consequences?
 How could G* not have K1, …, Kn as consequences?
CQ2: Why should K1, …, Kn be positively valued?
 How could K1, …, Kn not be positively valued?
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Operational Consideration. One last basic aspect that could enable x with 
a reason to assume G* is to know if x has the ability to (contribute to) 
realize G* and, also, if his assumption of G* is or is not idle regarding 
the realization of that objective. At this point, it is important to note that 
we are not here addressing the ability of x to carry out the means. This 
argument scheme will appear again later in the model where it can be 
appropriately used for that purpose. For its use in providing a reason to 
aim at the goal, ‘ability’ here is to be understood more broadly as ‘in a 
position’. For example, consider a husband who needs to pick his wife up 
from the train station. His having a driver’s licence that his children do 
not have could be an ability reason that enables him to realize the goal 
of picking her up. This ability, however, says nothing about the car being 
functional or otherwise available for him to perform the means of driving 
to get there. We recognize that if hard pressed, the ability reason does in-
deed boil down to an ability to perform the means, but think an important 
part of early practical reasoning rests on a preliminary consideration of an 
agent’s being in a position – having the ability – to achieve the goal. Since 
this scheme is used again later while addressing the means, it is not cru-
cial to follow the ability chain all the way to the end of the performance 
of the means here. Its second instantiation functions as an appropriate 
check on the means at that point.13 The argumentation at this stage should 
instantiate the following scheme:
 Argumentation Scheme 4. Argument from Ability14
 (AS4a)
Premise 1: G* should be positively valued
Premise 2: x has the ability to realize G*
Premise 3:   x’s ability to realize G* is a necessary/enabling condition 
for the realization of G*
Therefore, plausibly, 
Conclusion: There is a reason for x to assume G*
13 Changing AS4 to appear in two places is new in this articulation as compared to 
the forthcoming publication, but has been added in consultation with João Sàágua 
who maintains reservations about such a decision.
14 Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this 
constitutes a modest contribution to the field.
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In this scheme, the agent goes from the existence of a reason to carry 
out G* (Premise 1) to the existence of a reason for x, and not any other 
agent, to carry out G* (Premises 2 and 3). If x were not in a position 
to realize G*, or if the assumption of G* by x was unnecessary, in the 
sense that G* would occur anyway even if x would not assume it, then 
there would not be this reason for x assuming G*. The two reasons are 
not the same. Going back to the NATO example, the reason to carry 
out G* (NATO helping Ukraine increase its defensive power) can be, 
for example, because it ‘Promotes Peace’, which is considered to be a 
positive value (V+), while the reason for x assuming G* (and not any 
other agent) can be, for example, because NATO is in a better position 
to negotiate with the quarrelling parties, an operational reason. 
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 4a
CQ1: How does x have the ability to realize G*?
 What could prevent x from realizing G*?
CQ2:  To what extent is the assumption of G* by x a necessary/ena-
bling condition for the realization of G*?
  Which y exists (such that y≠x) whose ability to realize G* is a 
necessary/enabling condition for the realization of G*
Since we think that, normatively, it only makes sense to argue 
through the instantiation of AS4 if its Premise 1 has already been 
proven by another type of argumentation (AS1-AS3), we consider 
Premise 1 as assumed. For that reason, it does not need the associ-
ation of a CQ. Further, this illustrates the importance of following 
the argumentation schemes in order since if AS4 were used first, it 
would be unsupported. 
Let us imagine that all four schemes were employed on real argu-
mentation and that all of the CQs were answered successfully. While it 
may mean there are reasons to assume G*, it does not yet mean that x 
should assume G*. This is because the reasons x has for assuming G* 
are pro tanto and not pro toto. We thus have now to consider ‘the other 
side of the scale’.
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Stage 2. Topic 2
Topic 2 involves argumentation aimed at founding an answer (positive 
or negative) to the problem: ‘Is G* compatible with other goals, G1, 
….Gn, that x has or should have?’ As stated, the problem seems to lead 
to the idea that x has to consider the compatibility of G* with virtually 
every objective (including aims) that x has, as well as with all those that 
x should have. To complicate the situation further, we assume that there 
is no safe and sound method for the calculation of (in)compatibilities! 
Although seemingly extremely complex, this is not an intractable situa-
tion. It will be sufficient to use the Principle of Charity and, in a sense, 
to reverse the burden of proof. Given that we are speaking of human rea-
soning, using the principle of charity we shall assume from the outset 
that x is 1) usually not (knowingly) self-contradictory and 2) is not an 
inherently evil person. Obviously, there is place for a margin of error: x 
can overlook conflicting goals, or accidentally contradict himself and x 
can have instances of evil. Generally, however, we take x to be consist-
ent and morally neutral or good by default, thus reversing the burden of 
proof and leaving it to the opponent to build an argument to challenge a 
positive answer to Topic 2.
With these qualifications in mind, we consider the argumentation 
supporting an answer to the Topic to rest on the four following argumen-
tation schemes: the first argues against the assumption of G* because 
this objective promotes a negative value; the second argues against the 
assumption of G* because this objective contradicts or inhibits a pos-
itive value; the third argues against the assumption of G* because the 
enactment of this objective has negative consequences; the fourth is 
neutral regarding values and evaluations and simply argues that there is 
an operational incompatibility between G*, if assumed by x, and other 
objectives x has already assumed. The first three schemes thus concern 
objectives that x should have, while the fourth concerns the objectives 
x has. Since these schemes occur in the overall model twice – here as 
applied to the goal and later as applied to the means – on the flowchart 
they have been labelled ‘a’ and ‘b’ respectively, as was done with AS4 
above. This double applicability is represented in each scheme with 
G*/M*. Assumptions A2 and A3 above address our view on the flux 
between means and goals.
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 Argumentation Scheme 5. Argument from Negative Values15
 (AS5)
 Premise 1: the value V is negative (= V-)
 Premise 2:  V- negatively values G*/M*
 Therefore, plausibly,
 Conclusion: There is a reason for x not to assume G*/M
 Critical Questions for Argument Scheme 5
CQ1: What reasons are there for attributing a negative value to V?
 How could V not have a negative value?
CQ2:  What reasons are there for the negative evaluation of G*/M* 
by V-?
 How could G*/M* not be negatively valued by V-?
Argumentation Scheme 6. Argument Contradicting Positive Values16
 (AS6)
 Premise 1: Value V is positive (V+)
 Premise 2:  G*/M* contradicts (or inhibits) V+
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion:  There is a reason for x not to assume G*/M*
 Critical Questions for Argument Scheme 6
CQ1: What reasons are there for attributing a positive value to V?
 How could V not be valued positively?
CQ2:  What reasons are there to indicate G*/M* contradicting (inhib-
iting) V+?
 How could G*/M* be congruent with V+?
15 See, Argument from Negative Value (Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008: 321; Walton 
2013a: 103). The two remarks made above regarding the argumentative scheme on 
positive values apply, mutatis mutandis, also here, hence, we will not repeat them.
16 Although this scheme cannot be found as such in Walton, Reed, & Macagno 
(2008), or in Walton (2013a), it is considered a variant of the ‘Argument from 
Values’, easily manageable out of the two schemes that are ‘traditionally’ includ-
ed in it.
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  Argumentation Scheme 7. Argument from Negative Conse-
quences
 (AS7)
 Premise 1:  If G*/M* is realized by x, the consequences K1, 
…, Kn will occur
 Premise 2:  K1,…, Kn are to be negatively valued
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: There is a reason for x not to assume G*/M*
Similar remarks to those made for AS3 are applicable, mutatis mutan-
dis, here – with the exception of the ones regarding the existence of a 
second premise, which, in this case, already appear in the original for-
mulation of the scheme (see Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008: 332–333; 
Walton, 2013a: 102).
 Critical Questions for Argument Scheme 7
CQ1:  What makes it plausible that G*/M* has K1, …, Kn as conse-
quences?
 How could G*/M* not have K1, …, Kn as consequences?
CQ2: Why should K1, …, Kn be negatively valued?
 How could K1, …, Kn not be negatively valued?
Other schemes related to AS7 are rightly described by Walton, Reed & 
Macagno (2008, pp. 318–344) as in the realm of practical reasoning, 
but are not primitive. A discussion of how they relate to the primitive 
scheme would be an excellent topic for a further paper.
  Argumentation Scheme 8. Argument from Operational  
Incompatibility17
 (AS8)
 Premise 1: G is an objective already assumed by x
 Premise 2: G and G*/M* are operationally incompatible
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: There is a reason for x not to assume G*/M*
17 Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this 
constitutes a modest contribution to the field.
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It is noteworthy that in premise 1, the objectives of x are restricted to 
those already assumed by x and do not include those that the opponent 
considers x should assume. If the latter were included, the reference to 
values and evaluations would be unavoidable (and, for that, we already 
have AS5, AS6, and AS7). This scheme aims at situations in which the 
existence of a contradiction between the realization of certain objec-
tives already assumed by x and the new objective x is considering to as-
sume, G*, is ‘pointed out’. In this way it remains focused on operational 
incompatibility rather than ideological incompatibility.
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 8
CQ1:  What reasons are there for taking G as an objective already 
assumed by x?
 What reasons are there for doubting x already assumed G?
CQ2: What makes G and G*/M* operationally incompatible?
 How could G and G*/M* not be operationally incompatible?
Let us imagine that AS5, AS6, AS7, and AS8 were actually instantiated 
in a concrete argumentation and that they passed their respective CQs; 
or that at least one of them did. In that case, the practical argumentation 
that took place guaranteed that x has up to four, but at least one reason, 
for not assuming G*. Does this mean that x should not assume G*? Not 
yet. The reasons x has for not assuming G* are pro tanto, and not pro 
toto, so we have to decide between the two sides – we have to weigh the 
pros and cons. That is the purpose of Topic 3.
Excursus. Negotiation of Objectives
Before analysing the argumentation belonging to Topic 3, it is appropri-
ate to consider a situation in which a contradiction has arisen between 
an objective to be assumed, G*, and another objective !G. Instead of ar-
guing about which objective is preferable (Topic 3), one can argue for a 
modification to one of those objectives, or both. This is arguing through 
negotiation. It is important to emphasize precisely this argumentative 
aspect of the negotiation, because negotiation writ large does not have 
to be rational as in the case of pure threat, blackmail, or bribery.
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A simple18 example. Let us imagine that x already had as an ob-
jective, G, ‘To act in an environmentally-friendly way’. Now, x wins 
the lottery and can buy the car he always dreamt of. x is considering a 
new objective, G*, ‘To buy a Ferrari Testarossa’. Knowing the Testa-
rossa’s high fuel consumption, it is obvious that the second objective 
is incompatible with G – his aim to be environmentally friendly. To 
mark the incompatibility of G with G*, we will represent G as !G – 
in which ‘!’ is used to point out that contradiction with G*. Now, in 
a certain sense, x can choose between determining which of the two 
objectives, G* or !G, is preferable, thus going to Topic 3. Or x can try 
to modify one of the two objectives, or both, in order to make them 
compatible. Let us imagine that x enters into a process of argumen-
tative negotiation in which he will have to determine how far he can 
go in the modification of his objectives, G* and !G, in order to make 
them compatible, but also to think that he is still assuming that part 
of those objectives that x considers essential. Let us imagine, for in-
stance, that at the end of the negotiation (either with y or with himself) 
x modifies G*, ‘To buy a Ferrari Testarossa’ into, ‘To buy a Citröen 
DS5’. There is a clear sense in which the objective, G*, was preserved 
and modified: x now has the objective of buying a more environmen-
tally-friendly car that, although not a Ferrari, is still a fancy car. This 
is now, so to speak, the ‘car of his dreams’ insofar as it achieves the 
assumption of both goals rather than requiring the sacrifice of one. 
We consider that the argumentative process just illustrated consists 
in an instantiation of the following Argument Scheme. 
  Argumentation Scheme 9. Argument Based on Reasonable 
Negotiation19
 (AS9)
 AS9.1. Variation on !G
 Premise 1: !G and G*/M* are contradictory
 Premise 2: Modifying !G into Gi preserves the essential in !G
18 But it is obvious that this kind of situation can be enormously complex. For ex-
ample, consider the negotiation between social stakeholders: employers, unions, 
and government.
19 Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this 
constitutes a modest contribution to the field.
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 Premise 3: Gi is compatible with G*/M*
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x should assume Gi (instead of !G)
 AS9.2. Variation on G*
 Premise 1: !G and G*/M* are contradictory
 Premise 2:  Modifying G*/M* into G’ preserves the essential 
in G*/M*
 Premise 3: G’ is compatible with !G
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x should assume G’ (instead of G*/M*)
 AS9.3. Variation on G* and !G
 Premise 1: !G and G*/M* are contradictory
 Premise 2: Modifying !G into Gi preserves the essential in !G
 Premise 3:  Modifying G*/M* into G’ preserves the essential 
in G*/M*
 Premise 4: Gi and G’ are compatible
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion:  x should assume Gi and G’ (instead of !G and 
G*/M*, respectively)
Since premise 1 works as an assumption imported from the previous 
Topic we do no need to question the incompatibility. Accordingly, these 
are the remaining Critical Questions associated to this scheme (in any 
of its variations).
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 9
CQ1:  How do the modifications of !Gi into Gi or of G*/M* into G’, 
respectively, preserve the essential aspect(s) of each of the ini-
tial objectives?
  How might the modifications of !Gi into Gi or of G*/M* into 
G’, respectively, diminish/jeopardize the essential aspect(s) of 
each of the initial objectives?
CQ2:  What makes the schemes resulting from the proposed modifi-
cations (Gi/!Gi and G’/G*/M*) compatible?
  How might the schemes resulting from the proposed modifica-
tions (Gi/!Gi and G’/G*/M*) be incompatible?
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CQ3:  What incompatibilities with other objectives x has or should 
have result from the proposed modifications (Gi/!Gi or G’/
G*/M*)?
 How could one resolve these resulting incompatibilities?
We consider the burden of proof of CQ1 to be on the side of the propo-
nent and the burden of proof in the case of CQ2 and CQ3 to be on the 
side of the opponent (in line with what was stated about that matter in 
Topic 2).
Stage 2. Topic 3.
Topic 3 receives a situation of incompatibility (insurmountable, or over-
looked, by negotiation) between G* and one or more objectives/aims 
that x has or should have as input and has to provide a founded answer 
to the question: ‘Is G* preferable to the goals, !G1, …!Gn, with which 
it is incompatible?’. Intuitively, and simplifying slightly, if G* is pref-
erable to another objective, !G, with which it is incompatible, then that 
other objective should be abandoned and the reasoning should progress 
to Topic 4. If !G is preferable, then !G should (continue to) be assumed 
by x and the practical reasoning on G* ends here. To found the answer 
to the question, an argumentative process in favour of the preference 
for G* or for !G should be carried out. In addition, that argumentative 
process should take into account the specific results obtained in Topics 
1 and 2. Let us see this in greater detail. 
Topic 1 allowed for four types of reasons in favour of the assump-
tion of G*, of which at least one would have been positively associat-
ed to G*. Obviously, we are talking about several types of reasons. As 
mentioned above, this means that there can be several particular reasons 
in favour of the assumption of G* by x that are specimens of each one 
of those types. Topic 2 allowed for four types of reasons against the 
assumption of G*, of which at least one would have been negatively 
associated to G*. Here, we are again talking about types of reasons and 
so there can be several particular reasons against the assumption of G* 
by x that are specimens of each one of those types. This time, the par-
ticular reasons positively associated to G* in Topic 1 are the ones that 
must be weighed against the particular reasons negatively associated to 
G* in Topic 2. Resolving Topic 3 rationally articulates this process of 
‘weighing’ the reasons in favour/against the assumption G* by x. 
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  Argumentation Scheme 10. Argument Based on Rational 
Preference20
 (AS10)
 10.1 Variation in favour of G*/M
 Premise 1: !G and G*/M* are contradictory
 Premise 2: (R*±1, …, R*±n)G*/M*
 Premise 3: (!R±1, …, !R±n)!G
 Premise 4:  (R*±1, …, R*±n)G*/M* are preferable to (!R±1, 
…, !R±n)!G
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x should assume G*/M* (and abandon !G)
 10.2 Variation in favour of !G
 Premise 1: !G and G*/M are contradictory
 Premise 2: (R*±1, …, R*±n)G*/M*
 Premise 3: (!R±1, …, !R±n)!G
  Premise 4: (!R±1, …, !R±n)!G are preferable to (R*±1, …, 
R*±n)G*/M*
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x should assume !G (and abandon G*/M*)
In theory, the R*± of premise 2 were all identified in Topics 1 and 2. In 
concrete argumentative practice, if the matter is very serious, one can 
submit G* to a ‘second round’ of those very same Topics. It is almost 
certain that the !R± of premise 3 were not all identified when having G* 
and not !G in sight. Hence, one should now go through those two Topics 
having !G in sight. For that we do not need additional Topics or schemes. 
Thus, the individual reasons (R*±1, …, R*±n) and in (!R±1, …, !R±n) 
are just those reasons identified positively in Topic 1 or negatively in Top-
ic 2 for G* or !G.
What is being weighed ({R*±} vs. {!R±}) in premise 4, when the 
relation of preference is applied?
20 Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this 
constitutes a modest contribution to the field.
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1) All evaluations of reasons considered positive vs. all evaluations 
of reasons considered negative. For example, ‘In this situation 
S1, it is preferable to slightly sacrifice the value V1+, in order to 
greatly implement the value V2+’; or another example, ‘In the situ-
ation S2, it is preferable to slightly sacrifice K1+, to be able (in the 
future) to enjoy the positive consequence, K2+, that will increase 
the well-being of x in a more sustained way’.
2) Ideally, the subjective probabilities (possibly conditional) that x 
and y believe to be associated to both: (a) the success in realizing 
G* or, alternatively, !G; and (b) the ‘coming to existence’ of the 
reasons {R*±} and {!R±} as a result of the realization of that G*, 
or !G, respectively. For example: G* has a 0.9 probability of being 
realized, its R+I has a 0.7 probability to be implemented if G* is 
realized (repeated for each R+i) and its R-I has a 0.2 probability of 
occurring if G* is realized (repeated for each R-i); and a similar 
reasoning for !G and its associated reasons.
3) Most of the time and in alternative to 2), the subjective ‘plausibil-
ities’ which are equal to 2, but replacing the probabilistic quanti-
fication, between 0 and 1, by qualifiers such as ‘very’, ‘few’, and 
so on. We are not often capable of specifying a probability, even a 
subjective one, for the success of G* or of reasons that we believe 
to be associated to G*.21
4) The beliefs regarding the circumstances of the situation.
Importing the critical questions from above for the input premises 
(1–3), let us now see the CQs for premise 4. As noted above, the crit-
ical questions for this scheme depart slightly from the usual 1:1 ratio 
of critical question per term with inferential power. This is because, 
we believe, the term ‘preference’ entails both aspects of goodness and 
probability. Thus, the questions here, while focused only on the single 
term ‘preference’, address both of its component parts.
21 How people pick and assign probability and weight to reasons is an interesting 
and important question, but one which is ultimately a matter for psychologists. 
Further work could, however, address how one ought to assign probability and 
weight to reasons (See Lord & Maguire 2016).
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 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 10
CQ1:  What makes the standard(s) used for the evaluation of the rea-
sons associated with the goals/means the best for this situation? 
  Why might the standard(s) used for the evaluation of the reason 
associated with the goals/means not be the best for this situation? 
CQ2:  What makes the standard(s) used to assess the probability or 
plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the 
goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed the best for 
this situation? 
  Why might the standard(s) used to assess the probability or 
plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the 
goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed not be the 
best for this situation?
In short, these questions are challenging the goodness in the reasons and 
the accuracy of the probability of success, respectively. These questions 
are notoriously difficult to formulate because it is at this point where 
argumentation theory meets choice theory, and both meet moral theory.
Stage 3. Topic 4
This Stage begins when the objective G* has been rationally founded. We 
then need to associate one or more means to it. Here is where what has 
been called instrumental practical reasoning (Wallace 2014; Hitchcock 
2011), or ‘means-ends reasoning’ begins. The first question each agent 
will ask about the means can be vague, of the kind: ‘Is there any way to 
realize G*?’ As an answer to this question, the agent expects that rep-
resentations of actions he can carry out and whose implementation will 
bring him closer to the realization of G* until G* is realized will ‘pop into 
mind’ by a process that he usually does not control well. The agent might 
use his experience from similar cases along with other tools to marshal 
every means offered to him in any more or less fortuitous, more or less 
contextual, way. There are also studies pointing out the importance of 
automated or innate heuristics to ‘the finding of means’.22 Though the 
creation of reasons is a matter generally investigated within psychology, 
it also has philosophical implications (Smith 2010; Mizrahi 2014).
22 See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman (1974).
António Marques and João Sàágua - 9783034330589
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/09/2018 03:08:16PM
via free access
Practical Rationality at Work – A New Argumentation Model 219
From a philosophical point of view, one part of the important work 
consists in classifying the means into necessary or possible options. 
Accordingly, the problem of interest to us at Stage 3, Topic 4 is, ‘Are 
there means, M1, …, Mn (M*), to realize G* which are simultaneous-
ly necessary and sufficient for x to achieve G*?’. As a matter of fact, 
this problem includes two questions: 1) ‘are there means that have to 
be used if one intends to realize G*?’ and 2) ‘are those all the means 
needed to realize G*?’
A ‘Yes’ to the first question means that, without the use of those 
means by x, x is not able to realize G*. In that case, those means have 
to be used. Imagine a situation where the only way to beat a competitor 
is to kill him. While perhaps necessary (and say, sufficient) it is not usu-
ally something that should be done. Here we deal only with what has 
to be done, with the foresight of knowing that the ‘should’ is addressed 
shortly (Topics 6 and 7). 
However, a ‘No’ to the first question does not necessarily imply that 
there are no means available to realize G*. It can also imply that there are 
several alternative means that x can choose between. In that case, there is 
the problem of knowing if those means are sufficient. That is the problem 
of Topic 5. If they are, and given that x can choose, then the discussion 
about the ‘best means’ will be opened. That problem will be dealt with in 
Topic 6 and eventually 7. At present, a ‘No’ to the first question is simply 
tantamount to going to Topic 5, where we will deal with the problem of 
the existence, or not, of sufficient means to realize G*.
Let us now imagine that we answer ‘Yes’ to the question regarding 
the necessary means (NM). Now we need to know if the set {NM1, …, 
NMn} is sufficient to realize G*; or if, some other means besides {NM1, 
…, NMn} will still be needed. This is the raison d’être for our second 
question in Topic 5: ‘are the means necessary to realize G* sufficient in 
conjunction?’ If the answer is ‘Yes’, we go to Topic 6. If we answer ‘No’, 
it means that the set {NM1, …, NMn} has to be supplemented with more 
means from which a choice will have to be made. ‘Supplemented’, be-
cause {NM1, …, NMn} is not sufficient to realize G* and ‘a choice will 
have to be made,’ because if there were no choice, the added means would 
actually be necessary and would belong to {NM1, …, NMn}. Schemat-
ically: to realize G*, x has to use {NM1, …, NMn} and then still use 
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M1, or M2, or Mn (which do not belong to {NM1, …, NMn}), because 
without at least one of these means, x cannot realize G*. 
Schematized, we arrive at:
  Argumentation Scheme 11. Necessary Condition Argument23 
 (AS11)
 Premise 1: x has the objective of realizing G*
 Premise 2: .... {NM1, …, NMn} are necessary means for x real-
izing G*
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x has a reason to carry out {NM1, …, NMn}
There is no CQ for premise 1 because it works as an assumption, in the 
sense already explained.
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 11
CQ1:  What makes it plausible that {NM1, …, NMn} are necessary 
means for x realizing G*?
  How could any of these means be suppressed while still allow-
ing for the realization of G*?
Obviously, the argumentation aimed at showing the (defeasible) neces-
sity of any of the means has an extremely high sensitivity to context. 
Think of the necessary means for becoming President – a detailed dis-
cussion of what those means are will involve differing argumentative 
schemes derived from AS11, in the sense already explained. For that 
reason, the ‘course’ the argumentation will take in each case is difficult 
to predict. It also seems reasonable to accept that it is the proponent 
of the argument instantiating AS11 who has the initial burden of proof 
regarding the necessity of {NM1, …, NMn}, given that it requires the 
23 We have distanced ourselves from the ‘Necessary Condition Schema’ (Walton, 
Reed, & Macagno 2008: 323–324) for two reasons. The formulation of the ‘Alter-
natives Premise’ removes the necessity of each of the means by using the expression 
‘at least one of’, making them optional amongst themselves. Also, the formulation 
of the ‘Selection Premise’ and of the conclusion clearly shows that the scheme’s 
objective is to select ‘the best mean’ (referred as ‘Bi’), which will only be dealt 
with by us in Topics 6 and 7. These are not meant as criticism of the scheme, but as 
justification for not considering it primitive and thus not using it here.
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use of those means or the waiving of the realization of G* on reasonable 
grounds. 
Despite this highly contextual character, it is known that an argu-
ment in favour of a necessary condition (in the present case, a mean) 
ends with a conclusion in the form. ‘If not {NM1, …, NMn}, then not 
G*’, in which the conditional is material, and which is, thus, logical-
ly equivalent (by contraposition) to ‘If G*, then {NM1, …, MNn}‘. 
Any of those forms of the conclusion can be used to build a plausible 
argument in favour of the necessity of each one of the NMi, an argu-
ment whose premises will be, as already stated, strongly dependent 
on context. To determine if the means are sufficient, we can use the 
following scheme:
  Argumentation Scheme 12. Sufficient Condition Argument24 
 (AS12)
 Premise 1: x has the objective of realizing G*
 Premise 2:  If x carries out {NM1, …, NMn}, then x realizes G*
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x has a reason to carry out {NM1, …, NMn}
There is no CQ for Premise 1 because it works as an assumption in the 
sense already explained.
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 12
CQ1:  How does carrying out all of the necessary means guarantee the 
realization of G*?
  How might G* remain unrealized despite carrying out the nec-
essary means?
The same observations we made regarding the sensitivity to context 
of AS11 and its CQ are applicable to AS12 and its CQ, therefore we 
will not repeat them. The same can be said regarding the matter of the 
burden of proof. 
Likewise, and despite this highly contextual character, it is known 
that an argument in favour of a sufficient condition (in the present case, 
 
24 See the previous footnote. Similar considerations can be applied here in regard to 
‘22.3. Sufficient Condition Schema’ (Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008: 323–324).
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a mean) ends with a conclusion of the form: ‘If {NM1, …, NMn}, then 
G*’, in which the conditional is material, and which is, thus, logically 
equivalent (by contraposition) to ‘If not G*, then not {NM1, …, NMn}’. 
Any of these forms of conclusion can be used to build a plausible argu-
ment in favour of the sufficiency of each mean, taken in conjunction – an 
argument whose premises will be, as already stated, strongly dependent 
on context.
Finally, it is one thing to recognize necessary and sufficient means, 
and another to ensure that x has the ability to carry them out. Further, 
in our view, being the only one able to carry out the means can provide 
an additional reason for x to pursue M*. Accordingly, we re-use the 
scheme for ability from Topic 1 and include it in Topic 4 (and Topic 5 
if it should be necessary), in a similar but slightly modified way. The 
similarity is that, as before, it still only becomes necessary after the 
other schemes in the Topic have been addressed. In other words, for this 
Topic, if there are no means then there is no need to consider the agent’s 
ability to carry out the non-existent means. The modification is that, in 
this instantiation, ability does not refer to ‘being in a position’ but rath-
er, more directly, to ‘being able to perform’.
 Argumentation Scheme 4b. Argument from Ability
 (AS4b)
 Premise 1:  M* are necessary and sufficient (or at least suffi-
cient) for G*
 Premise 2: x has the ability to realize M*
 Premise 3:   x’s ability to realize M* is a necessary/enabling 
condition for the realization of G*
 Therefore, plausibly, 
 Conclusion:  There is a reason for x assuming M*
In this scheme, we go from the existence of a reason to carry out G* 
(Premise 1) to the existence of a reason for x to carry out M* (Premises 
2 and 3). For the same reasons as presented in Topic 1, if x did not have 
the ability to realize M*, or if the assumption of G* by x was unnec-
essary, in the sense that G* would occur anyway even if x would not 
assume it, then there would not be a reason for x assuming M*.
Also for the same reasons as mentioned with this scheme in Topic 1, 
there are only two Critical Questions needed for this scheme.
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 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 4b
CQ1:  How does x have the ability to realize M*?
 What could prevent x from realizing M*?
CQ2:  To what extent is the assumption of M* by x a necessary/en-
abling condition for the realization of M*?
  Is there any y (such that y≠x) whose ability to realize M* is a 
necessary/enabling condition for the realization of M*
Stage 3. Topic 5
An agent only arrives at this Topic if the prior argumentation leads to a 
negative answer to the question ‘Are there means M1, …Mn which are 
simultaneously necessary and sufficient for x to achieve G*?’ (Topic 4). 
If the Topic reveals that there are necessary but not sufficient conditions, 
then we are then directed to Topic 5 while bringing with us a set of nec-
essary means (if they were also sufficient we would have gone to Topic 6, 
without going through Topic 5). However, this difference between having 
or not having means does not substantially affect the formulation of the 
scheme, which, in reality, is nothing more than our well-known AS12, now 
formulated in a more general way: AS12G (here, ‘G’ means ‘General’). 
 Argumentation Scheme 12. Sufficient Condition Argument25
 (AS12G)
 Premise 1: x has the objective of realizing G*
 Premise 2:  If x carries out {NM1, …, NMn} and {SM1 or, 
…, or SMn}, then x realizes G*
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion:  x has a reason to carry out {SM1 or, …, or 
SMn} (in addition to the reasons x may have 
to carry out {NM1, …, NMn})
Since the question ‘Are there necessary means to realize G*?’ would 
have been positively answered in Topic 4 and since a negative answer 
would be inconsequential and leave us only to consider the sufficient 
means, no specific CQ on them is provided here.
25 See the previous footnote.
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The critical question associated to this scheme, then, addresses the 
sufficient means.
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 12G
CQ1:  How does carrying out at least one of SMi, where SMi belongs 
to {SM1, …, SMn} (in addition to {NM1, …, NMn}, if there 
are such) guarantee the realization of G*?
  How might G* remain unrealized in spite of carrying out all of 
these means?
All of the remarks made in Topic 4 about that version of AS12 are natu-
rally applicable to AS12G and so we will not repeat them.
Further, because any number of new sufficient conditions may 
have been introduced in this Topic, AS4b applies here as well.
If the concrete argumentation that instantiates AS12G is negatively 
concluded, that means that there are no sufficient means to realize G* 
and the reasoning/argumentation stops here.
If the concrete argumentation instantiating AS12G is positively 
concluded, that means that there is more than one means M1, …, Mn 
(that is sufficient) for x realizing G*, i.e. there several possible means 
for x realizing G*.26 In this case x may choose the one that he considers 
the best means. As expected, the choice of the best means is a process 
subjected to argumentation. This takes us to Topics 6 and 7. 
Stage 4. Topic 6
Topic 6 involves an argumentative process aimed at founding an answer 
(positive or negative) to the question: ‘Are the selected means, M1, …, 
Mn, compatible with the objectives G1, …, Gn, that x has or should 
have?’ In this sense, the Argumentation Schemes and respective Critical 
Questions to be used are exactly the same as the ones proposed for Topic 
2, as is immediately perceivable if we replace, in the formulation of the 
problem, ‘the selected means, M1, …, Mn’ by ‘the objective G*?’ (as 
formulated in Topic 2). In line with what was stated above, we consider 
26 Of course, if there are also necessary (but not sufficient) means, it will be nec-
essary to combine them through a distribution of conjunction over disjunction. 
Thus: {NM1, …, NMn} and SM1, or {NM1, …, NMn} and …, or {NM1, …, 
NMn} and SMn.
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that the burden of proof is on the side of the opponent here as well (even 
if this is x with ‘second thoughts’, before going into action, on whether 
he should or should not use the means M1, …, Mn, to realize G*).
We thus consider the schemes AS5 to AS9 to be reproduced here, 
along with their respective CQs and what we stated in their regard in 
Topic 2. The only difference is that the schemes and critical questions 
here employ the M* side of the G*/M* option where M* indicates ‘set 
of selected means’. We now simply need to add an illustration and an 
explanation. 
It suffices to recall our presidential ‘murderer example’ (mentioned 
in Topic 4): there may not be any incompatibility between the objective 
‘To be President of the Portuguese Republic’ and all the other objec-
tives that x has or should have. But if, at a given time, the means chosen 
by x to realize this objective is ‘To get his most direct rival candidate 
killed’, then this means will surely clash, no matter how efficient it is, 
with several other objectives or aims x has or should have.
Explanation: Three cases to be considered.
Case 1. If, among M1, …, Mn, only necessary means are to be found, 
then the conclusion that one of those means is incompatible with G1, 
…, Gn, immediately leads us to the argumentative process taking place 
in Topic 7.
Case 2. If, among M1, …, Mn, several sufficient means are to be 
found (thus resulting from a list of alternative means corresponding to 
the affirmative answer to the question of Topic 5), then if some of those 
alternative means, but not all, are considered incompatible with G1, …, 
Gn, through the argumentative process taking place in Topic 6, that may 
permit us to select only the compatible ones (given that, hypothetically, 
any one of them is sufficient to realize G*) which immediately leads us 
to Stage 5 and a decision to act.
Case 3. In the case of the sufficient means, only if all of them (that 
is, all possible means) are considered incompatible with G1, …, Gn, 
will we be directed to the argumentative process of Topic 7. 
Also in regard to Topic 6, it will be possible to try a procedure of 
negotiation like the one described in the Excursus and associated with 
AS9. With this supplementary proviso: the potential modifications to be 
introduced into M1, …, Mn, cannot remove the effectiveness of any of 
these means making them no longer sufficient to realize G*. 
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Stage 4. Topic 7
Topic 7 involves an argumentative process aiming at founding a (pos-
itive or negative) answer to the question: ‘Are the means M1….Mm, 
preferable to the goals !G1, ….!Gn, with which they are incompati-
ble?’. AS10 (and variants) with their respective Critical Questions can 
also be used here, as can be immediately perceived if we replace the 
occurrences of ‘M1, …, Mn’ by ‘G*’ in the formulation of the problem. 
Likewise, the comments we associated to the presentation of AS10 and 
its CQ in Topic 3 are applicable here with the same caveat that the M* 
option is to be used in this Stage. Hence, nothing else needs to be added 
at this time. 
Stage 5. Decision
In Stage 5, the final stage, there is not exactly a problem to be dealt 
with and to be answered, so this stage does not contain a Topic. It is 
only the matter of capitalizing on the reasoning process and on the ar-
gumentative course realized in the previous Topics, whether one has 
gone through all the Topics or just some of them. Obviously, the process 
may be stopped at any time, simply by answering ‘No’ to Topic 1, or 
from then on answering ‘No’ two consecutive times. If that happens, the 
agent may decide either not to act, or to make an appropriate modifica-
tion to the goal or means (depending on where the process was stopped) 
and begin again with the modification in place. If the process is not 
stopped, however, and we have arrived at Stage 5, then it is now just the 
matter of making a decision (practical reasoning) or recommending the 
action (practical argumentation) founded on all the process, or courses, 
which started at Topic 1. Therefore, if we consider Γ as the best formu-
lation of the argumentative thread that started at Topic 1 and ended in 
Stage 5, we can propose:
– For practical reasoning: ‘Given that I accept Γ, I justifiably (do not) 
intend to carry out M1, …, Mn, to realize G*’.
– For practical argumentation: ‘Γ being given, the recommendation 
that x carries out M1, …, Mn to realize G* is (not) justified’.
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Conclusion
To conclude, given the detail in the explanations above, we will start by 
risking a limited amount of repetition for the sake of clarity. The above 
presentation constitutes our efforts to contribute a new integrated model 
of practical reasoning and argumentation to the field. Imagining a hu-
man agent in any given circumstance, the model begins by asking if the 
agent has a reason to alter the current state of the world. With the aim of 
providing a model extending beyond mere instrumental reasoning, we 
have included consideration of the motivations for aiming at a goal as 
the first step in explicit practical reasoning and argumentation.
The complete model is composed of five stages: Stage one address-
es the agent’s motivation for action; Stage two is concerned with the 
proposed goal and other goals; Stage three concerns available means for 
achieving the proposed goal; Stage four deals with the relation between 
the means and other goals; and Stage five is simply the decision to act 
or not. If the agent progresses through all five Stages, they will have 
reasonable grounds for deciding to act. If they are stopped at any stage, 
they will then have reasonable grounds for not acting. 
In order to license moving from one Stage to the next, the agent 
must answer one or two ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ Topic questions. In any case, an 
affirmative answer results in a ‘green light’ to move to the next Stage. In 
some cases, a negative answer or ‘red light’ will lead to another Topic 
and thus a second chance to move to the next Stage. In other cases, a 
negative answer leads straight to a conclusion not to act.
Each Topic questions an aspect of the general theme of the Stage. 
Answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the Topics is not, however, based merely on 
the free thinking or intuitions of the agent. In order to reasonably an-
swer the Topic questions, the agent must have reasons supporting their 
answer. Those reasons can be specified using an appropriate argument 
scheme. The model indicates what we consider to be the basic, neces-
sary schemes to justify an answer to each one of the Topics, though in 
practice an agent may of course use schemes over and above the pro-
vided list.
Importantly, the reasons which emerge from the schemes are to be 
considered pro tanto, or contributory reasons, in the way that Jonathan 
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Dancy (2004) has characterized them. This consideration is important 
because of two major implications it carries through the reasoning. First, 
it means a reason on one side is not, by itself, enough to license moving 
to a conclusion to act or not act. The questions and schemes are set up 
in oppositional fashion so that contributing reasons from both sides can 
be weighed. For example, an agent using the schemes associated with 
Topic 1 could come up with four reasons to pursue the goal. Rather 
than jumping straight to a conclusion to pursue it, however, Topic 2 is 
aimed at finding reasons not to pursue it. Only after both reasons for and 
reasons against have been addressed is the agent free to look for means. 
Second, reasons being contributory also means that one reason 
may outweigh all opposing reasons. In other words, the number of rea-
sons and weight provided to one side of the ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer are not 
in a strict relationship. Thus, even though there may be four reasons for 
accepting the proposed means and one reason against, that one reason 
may outweigh the other four.
We have also aimed to improve the way moral considerations are 
included in the model in a few important ways. First, we have provided 
a way to include consequentialist and other moral considerations. While 
consequences are addressed during the selection of both the goal and 
the means, any given moral principle can be used in our Argumentation 
Scheme 10, which performs an overall weighing between a proposed 
goal or means and incompatible alternatives an agent has or should 
have. Rather than stipulate a moral authority for these decisions, a Crit-
ical Question for the Scheme asks the user to justify why the moral 
standard they have chosen is best, and to account for the exclusion of 
others. In the absence of a universally agreed authoritative moral theo-
ry, we think that the best that can be done at present is to argue for the 
selection of the chosen standard in rational use at any given time.
Second, we have included moral evaluation of the means and not 
just the goal. Such an inclusion may have a much bigger impact than 
at first appears as was partially demonstrated through our example of 
wanting to become president but killing to do so. While there may be 
nothing wrong with having a goal to become president, if one overlooks 
the moral component of killing to get there, an important check on the 
decision-making process has been overlooked.
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Finally, when filled out, the use of such a model provides many op-
portunities for the evaluation of the reasoning or argumentation. While 
a full theory of evaluation is better suited for another paper, at this point 
it suffices to point out that evaluation can take the form of pointing 
to Argumentation Schemes that were not used when they could have 
been, pointing to poor usage of the Argumentation Schemes that we 
employed, assessing the quality of the answers to the Critical Ques-
tions, and acknowledging the inclusion or lack thereof of goals an agent 
should have. In all of these cases, an evaluator can pinpoint an exact 
component in the process and recommend a systematic solution for im-
provement. 
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In this essay we will outline the constituent process that took place in 
Italy between 25 July 1943 (the fall of Fascism) and 1 January 1948 
(the effective promulgation date of the Republican Constitution), pay-
ing special attention to the debate that arose during the sessions of the 
Constituent Assembly between 2 June 1946 and 27 December 1947.
This essay is based on Jon Elster’s paper, Arguing and bargaining 
in two constituent assemblies2, which focuses on the study of constitu-
ent processes and, above all, constituent debates. The theoretical issues 
raised by the concept of constituent power3 will remain in the back-
ground for reasons of space.
1 Giovanni Damele is the author of section 8; Francesco Pallante is the author of 
sections 3–7 and 9. Sections 1, 2 and 10 are the fruit of a shared reflection.
2 ELSTER 2000 (the paper was based on a conference held at Yale University in 
1991).
3 In Italian constitutionalist doctrine, see at least: BARILE 1966, DOGLIANI 1986 
and 1990, MORTATI 1972, GRASSO 1985, PACE 1997, RESCIGNO 1996. In in-
ternational literature, the following writers have recently worked on standardizing 
constituent processes with regulatory intents: GINSBURG-ELKINS-BLOUNT 
2009, ELKINS-GINSBURG-MELTON 2009; GINSBURG 2012.
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2. The Elster diagram
The summary indications in Elster’s essay can be broken down into 
seven main steps of constituent processes:
1) convocation of the constituent assembly
2) choice of the delegate selection procedure
3) definition of the mandate of the assembly and of the delegates
4) verification of the delegates’ credentials
5) choice of the decision-making procedure to be adopted during the 
assembly
6) discussion and approval of the constitution by the assembly
7) ratification of the constitution
The Norwegian scholar first distinguishes between the first two steps 
and the following ones, claiming that the convocation of the constit-
uent assembly and the choice of the delegate selection procedure are 
performed by independent authorities who are not part of the assem-
bly, while all of the other steps refer to assembly decisions (under 
penalty of establishing a puppet-body that simply enacts the will of 
others)4.
This point is pivotal: only a process that is possibly “self-founded” 
can truly be considered as “constituent”, whereas a process which fol-
lows from a decision by a pre-existing body5 should be considered as 
being “constituted”.
4 ELSTER 2000: 358–59 (in addition to 361–62, 364 and 366).
5 RESCIGNO 1996: 34 et seq.
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3. The convocation of the constituent assembly
A) Starting from the first step, according to Elster, the authority conven-
ing the constituent assembly may be6:
– the constitution itself, if it provides for periodic constituent 
assemblies (Thomas Jefferson’s idea). The idea that the constitu-
tion provides for its total review is similar (see Article 193 of the 
Constitution of the Helvetic Confederation; something similar 
happened in Spain in 1978)7.
– an authority different from that of the State to which the consti-
tution will apply: for example, an occupying power (as in West-
ern Germany and Japan after the Second World War). Today, the 
hypothesis that a non-State authority has an international character 
prevails (consider Kosovo and Afghanistan).
– a provisional government resulting from a revolution (as in France 
with the 1789 and 1848 revolutions) or a coup (the case of the 
Ghana Constitution of 1992). Naturally, a revolution or coup does 
not always involve the use of violence (since the constituent assem-
blies convened by bodies belonging to the previous constitutional 
organization – like the French National Convention which approved 
the 1793 Constitution – would allegedly fall under this hypothesis).
– a mixed government or a seat of concertation between the old 
regime and the opposition (which is what happened in Poland in 
1989 with the so-called Round Table Agreement).
B)  In the Italian case, the convocation of the Constituent Assembly 
may be formally traced back to two documents:
– Law Decree no. 151/1944, which provides for the election of a 
Constituent Assembly to pass resolutions on all aspects (including 
the institutional form: monarchy and republic?) of the “new State 
Constitution” (the so-called first provisional Constitution).
6 ELSTER 2000: 358, note 64.
7 Contra PACE 1997: 8 et seq., in his opinion these hypotheses amount to the prac-
tice of a constituted power.
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– Delegated Decree no. 98/1946, which redefines the powers of the 
Constituent Assembly establishing that the institutional issue must 
be solved by popular referendum to be held at the same time as the 
election of the assembly itself (so-called second provisional Con-
stitution).
Both documents were adopted by provisional governments of national 
unity, hence by external authorities according to the Elster diagram: the 
former was enacted by the Bonomi government, the latter by the first 
De Gasperi government. In both cases, there were also influences from 
the monarchy and the Allies.
Elster notes that, since it is not clear whether the new or old rules 
apply at the time of constituent processes, the relationships between 
the old and new regimes often give rise to a logic paradox by virtue of 
the framers’ attempt to give their actions formal legitimacy based on 
pre-existing legal arrangements8.
In the Italian case, a clear symptom of these problems is the dif-
ferent format taken by the two decrees: one is a law decree, the other 
is a delegated decree. The difference is explained by the fact that the 
document dated 1944 – adopted under Article 3 of Law no. 100/1926 – 
establishes the delegation of legislative powers to the government; con-
sequently, only subsequent documents may be delegated documents. 
However, since law decrees are temporary, there is the problem of the 
conversion of Law Decree no. 151/1944 into law: the fifteenth transito-
ry and final disposition of the Constitution did so, however, terming it a 
… “delegated decree”.
4. The delegate selection procedure 
A) As concerns the selection method of assembly members, Elster 
stresses that the deciding authority should be different from the one con-
vening the assembly; however this would create a “puppet assembly” 
8 ELSTER 2000: 360.
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since the delegates would allegedly be selected based on their loyalty 
to the convening authority9. The Norwegian political scientist does not, 
however, linger on subjects regarding the selection of the delegates10.
B) In the Italian case, the document establishing the methods of for-
mation of the Constituent Assembly is Delegated Decree no. 74/1946, 
which introduced a strictly proportional electoral law. The selection of 
the assembly members was referred to the people, convened on 2 June 
1946 to vote by universal suffrage for the first time. It is clear, however, 
that the definition of the electoral system was extremely important and 
was largely affected by the fact that the parties were not familiar with 
their electoral “weight” (since they opted, Rawls-style, for the choice 
that would have secured them in case of defeat).
In the Italian case, two independent authorities were involved: the 
provisional government, which established the electoral system, and the 
Italian people, who elected the assembly delegates. This partly proves 
the Elster diagram wrong since the provisional government intervened 
in both phases – convocation and selection of the members – which 
preceded the formation of the Assembly.
5. The definition of the mandate
A) As concerns the definition of the mandate, the question is whether 
there is a constraint. On the practical side, it is easy – as Elster writes – 
for the authority convening the constituent assembly (or, more rarely, the 
one selecting its members) to try to influence the outcome of the work 
by constraining the mandate of the delegates. It is, however, equally easy 
for the constituent process to get away from its “creator” (which is what 
happened to Louis XVI)11.
9 ELSTER 2000: 359, in particular note 65, which gives the example of “the body 
of 66 men convened in China by Yuan Shikai in 1914 to give his rule a semblance 
of legality through a ‘constitutional compact’”.
10 ELSTER 2000: 359.
11 ELSTER 2000: 361–62.
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Aside from its practical infeasibility, the Norwegian scholar does 
not give a completely negative opinion of putting constraints on the 
mandate because it can be useful in order to strengthen the threats made 
during the bargaining12.
B) In the Italian case, it could be believed that a type of constraint was 
applied to the mandate of the Constituent Assembly members by not 
allowing them to decide on the institutional question.
As already mentioned, Law Decree no. 151/1944 initially stated 
that the selection was the responsibility of the Assembly, then Delegated 
Decree no. 98/1946 re-examined the issue, referring the decision to the 
people by referendum. This is one of the key steps of the entire Italian 
constituent process. Despite the fact that the 1944 decree resulted from 
a comprehensive agreement involving the Allies, CLN (National Libera-
tion Committee) parties and the monarchy, Lieutenant Umberto broke the 
understanding, asking the people to decide on the institutional question. 
Along the same lines, the (mainly monarchist) Italian Liberal Party and 
the Christian Democracy (DC) were concerned about the gap between the 
Party’s positions and those of its electorate (considered more inclined to 
institutional continuity). De Gasperi also convinced the Allies to support 
the referendum as a solution. On the contrary, the left-wing parties and 
the Actionists favoured abiding by the original provisions of Law Decree 
no. 151/194413.
The issue was first raised by De Gasperi on 10 October 1945 un-
der the Parri government. A complex debate arose which became inter-
twined with the two additional issues of whether or not the Constituent 
Assembly should also act as a law-making body and whether the Con-
stituent Assembly should pass resolutions by a simple or a qualified ma-
jority. The Council of Ministers (and the so-called Cabinet, a selected 
committee made up of the ministries representing the CLN parties) was 
involved in these debates during the sessions held between 19 February 
and 2 March 1946 until the secretaries of the DC, PSI and PCI agreed 
to approve Delegated Decree no. 98/1946 under the De Gasperi gov-
ernment.
12 ELSTER 2000: 363.
13 The event is carefully re-enacted in RICCI 1996: 449–459.
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6. The verification of credentials 
A) Elster considers the verification of the credentials of the constituent 
assembly delegates a logic paradox (in addition to the paradox on the 
legal origin of the constituent assembly): the assembly cannot verify the 
credentials of the delegates without taking office, but – at the same time – 
it cannot take office without having first verified the credentials of its 
member14. An independent audit would be necessary, but this would 
undermine the independence of the assembly. In France, the issue was 
hotly debated during the Estates General convened by Louis XVI, and 
a solution was found on the basis of the following consideration: “It is 
impossible to believe that the majority of those who present themselves 
as delegates should not have valid credentials”15.
B) In the Italian case, the Constituent Assembly established a Commit-
tee responsible for verifying the credentials of elected members, which 
it did, making some replacements.
The issue raised no specific debates because the Assembly worked 
on the basis of the parliamentary procedures of the pre-Fascist Low-
er House (Camera dei Deputati), which had already provided that the 
Council was competent for the election.
7. The choice of the decision-making procedure
A) Elster mentions the following problems regarding the choice of the 
procedures to be adopted during the assembly to discuss and approve 
the constitution16:
14 ELSTER 2000: 366.
15 ELSTER 2000: 366.
16 ELSTER 2000: 367 and 404–405.
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1) the duration of the sessions
2) whether the constituent assembly should also act as a law-making 
body
3) how to decide on the allocation of the time between law-making 
and constitution-making
4) the possibility to establish constitution-drafting or problem-solving 
committees
5) whether to proceed in closed sessions or open the debates to the 
public. (Elster believes that closed sessions encourage bargaining 
and arguing because it is easier to change opinion.)17
6) the quorum and the voting method (by “person” or by group18? 
And, if by “person”, by roll call, show of hands, division of the 
assembly etc.?)
7) the procedure of transforming votes into decisions
B) In the Italian case, we must refer to Article 4 of Delegated Decree no. 
98/1946 that applied to the Assembly the procedures promulgated for the 
Lower House in July 1900, as repeatedly amended until 1922. The Con-
stituent Assembly itself made some “additions”. In short, the decision on 
the procedures was made by an independent authority (the provisional 
government, although with the Assembly’s tacit consent) in lieu, as the 
Elster diagram provides, of the Constituent Assembly.
Let us now look more closely at the individual profiles identified by 
Elster. Starting with the duration, Delegated Decree no. 98/1946 estab-
lished an eight-month deadline from the first session (held on 25 June 
1946). This deadline could be extended by no more than four months. 
After using such an extension, the Assembly applied for an additional 
six-month extension (plus a few days, to set the deadline at 31 De-
cember 1947) since the duration was decided partly by an independent 
authority (the provisional government), and partly by the Constituent 
Assembly itself.
As concerns law-making powers, the CLN was internally divided 
between the DC and PLI, which wanted, with the support of the Allies, 
17 ELSTER 2000: 410–411 (on the usefulness that the involved parties may change 
their ideas, also see p. 385).
18 The question was hotly debated during the French Constitutional Assembly 
(ELSTER 2000: 367–368).
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to limit the competences of the Assembly to constitution-making top-
ics (leaving ordinary law-making powers to the government) and left-
wing parties, which thought it preferable to refer the decision to the 
Constituent Assembly. The question had to do with the fear that the 
left-wing parties, if they won the election, might have exploited the As-
sembly’s powers in order to establish “revolutionary” legislation. The 
problem was addressed together with those of the subject in charge of 
making the institutional choice and the quorum of the Constituent As-
sembly. In this case, the solution is also found in Delegated Decree no. 
98/1946 (Art. 3). Although the provision ratified the victory of moder-
ate parties, the Assembly was permitted to indicate bills that, though 
not part of its law-making competence, were to be submitted for its 
resolution19.
Moving on to the time of the sessions, the division between consti-
tution-making and “ordinary” activity20 was decided with the planning 
of the sessions by the Constituent Assembly itself: 375 public sessions 
were held, 173 of which focused on the discussion and approval of the 
new Constitution.
Concerning the establishment of constitution-drafting committees, 
a Constitutional Committee was appointed under the presidency of 
Meuccio Ruini in order to prepare the Constitution draft. The 75-mem-
ber Committee was split into three sub-committees: (1) citizens’ rights 
and duties; (2) constitutional organization of the State, (which was then 
split into two branches: one on executive power, one on judicial power 
and the Constitutional Court; a selected committee was also established 
for the regional system); and (3) economic and social relationships. The 
topics of the first and the third sub-committees partially overlapped, so 
a Coordinating Committee was established to unify their work. Even-
tually, a Drafting Committee (with 18 members) prepared the text of 
the final draft, coordinating and harmonizing the work of the three 
sub-committees.
19 For a re-enactment of the event, see RICCI 1996: 449–459.
20 In addition to the opinions on the draft legislative decrees, the Assembly’s main 
non-constituent activities were the vote of confidence for the De Gasperi Govern-
ments II, III and IV; the approval of the budget laws for 1947 and 1948; and the 
ratification of the peace treaties signed in Paris on 10 February 1947.
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As concerns whether the sessions were public or closed, the Con-
stituent Assembly’s activity was public, but that of the Committee and 
its various sub-committees was not since the Italian people were not 
permitted to directly attend the entire constitution-making process21. 
The debate was covered by the press22 and the Ministry for the Constit-
uent Assembly also provided extensive information.
The quorum and voting method were governed by the pre-fascist 
procedures of the Lower House23. Voting (by “person”) was by ballot for 
the final approval of the bills and by sitting and standing in all other cas-
es (unless ten members asked for voting by division, fifteen by roll call, 
and twenty by ballot). The quorum was the majority of participants. 
Under these rules, the Constitution was approved on 22 December 1947 
with voting by ballot by roll call (out of 515 participants, 453 votes in 
favour, 62 against).
As concerns the “procedure for transforming votes into deci-
sions”24, once approved, the Italian Constitution was enacted by the 
provisional Head of State, Enrico De Nicola, on 27 December 1947 and 
published immediately in an extraordinary edition of the Official Ga-
zette no. 298 of the same day. It came into effect on 1 January 1948.
8. The discussion
A) Elster believes that constitution-making projects represent a “par-
adigmatic case” useful to highlight two types of dialogue: arguing 
and bargaining. Those “types” are exhibited in “their most striking 
forms”25 in constituent assemblies, which are more polarized than or-
dinary law-making bodies and oscillate between “higher law-making” 
 
21 PALDIN 2004: 46 (and 48–49) writes, on the other hand, that the sessions were 
often “quite confidential”.
22 POMBENI 1995: 93–96.
23 RICCI 1996: 449–459.
24 ELSTER 2000: 367.
25 ELSTER 2000: 347.
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and “sheer appeal to force”. Elster also introduces a third type of (in 
Elster’s words) “speech act”: “rhetorical statements aiming at persua-
sion”, though he is uncertain about its proper analytical characteriza-
tion. However, it seems that the distinction between the three types is a 
question of “motives”. Not those of the speakers, which Elster distin-
guishes as “reason”, “passion” and “interest”, but the motives that the 
speakers ascribe to their audience. Rhetoric may perhaps be defined 
“by the feature that its practitioners appeal to the passions of their audi-
ence rather than to their reason or self-interest” since “in some debates 
reason speaks to reason; in others, interest to interest; in still others, 
passion to passion”26. Somehow, Elster’s triadic model seems to reflect 
Aristotle’s three-part division of persuasion modes, where logos can 
easily be matched with arguing, ethos can refer to bargaining (where 
the criterion of credibility is key) and pathos could match “rhetoric” 
within the meaning given by Elster, i.e. an appeal to the passions of the 
audience. However, Elster does not develop this parallelism, nor does 
he develop the analysis of the more genuinely pathetic components of 
assembly discussions.
A.1. (Arguing and bargaining). For Elster, rational arguing is subject 
to criteria of validity, and promises or threats to criteria of credibility27. 
The former recalls Habermas’s theory of communicative action, binding 
a speaker aiming at understanding and not sheer success to “three va-
lidity claims: propositional truth, normative rightness, and truthfulness”. 
Even speakers who are not “genuinely moved by impartial considerations 
of the common good”, but whose concerns are “purely self-interested”, 
may still be forced or induced “to substitute the language of impartial 
argument for the language of self-interest”28. This substitution would be 
the fruit of the civilizing force of hypocrisy, thanks to which “a speaker 
who wants to appear as aiming at understanding must also appear to be 
committed to these claims”29. Consequently, “one need not always op-
pose impartiality and self-interest” since “one may offer an argument 
from self-interest for impartiality”. Such a typical argument is the 
26 ELSTER 2000: 371, no. 116.
27 ELSTER 2000: 372.
28 ELSTER 2000: 349.
29 ELSTER 2000: 373.
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so-called “veil of ignorance”30, or, in general, represents all those cases in 
which “apparently self-interested behaviour” may actually be guided “by 
impartial concerns”31. Authenticity, or sincerity, on the other hand may be 
traced back – at least in one of its versions – to consistency, which is not 
incompatible with what could be defined as argumentative hypocrisy32. It 
would be important to distinguish between authentic changes of opinion, 
which per se would not reveal an inconsistent argument, and actual op-
portunism33.
As concerns arguing, Elster distinguishes arguments as “tending to 
be” either consequentialist or deontological. Roughly speaking: appeal-
ing “to overall efficiency” or “to individual rights”. The latter, as well as 
those “based on the public good” and those “which rely on some version 
of utilitarianism”, are considered impartial because of their generaliz-
ability34. Starting from these arguments, the framers would somehow 
prove that they are motivated by impartial reason, despite being perme-
able to self-interested considerations, as we have noted. Elster qualifies 
framers as imperfectly rational35. 
While rational discussion is supposed to be based only on the “pow-
er of the better argument”, constitutional bargaining, by contrast, rests 
on “resources that can be used to make threats (and promises) credible”. 
Such resources may be extra-political or intra-political. The latter include 
the exchange of concessions36. The use of these resources is strictly de-
pendent on the framers’ ability to make them credible: the framers’ credi-
bility affects the credibility of their threats and/or their promises.
A.2. (Pure and impure types). In the analysis of the actual arguments 
of the two assemblies, the two types seem to translate in a sequence of 
“mixed” or “impure” cases. On the one hand, a strategic use of (appar-
ently) non-strategic arguments is not only possible but common, and in 
some cases desirable: in these cases, “self-interested actors often try”, 
 
30 ELSTER 2000: 374.
31 ELSTER 2000: 388.
32 ELSTER 2000: 413.
33 ELSTER 2000: 377.
34 ELSTER 2000: 378–379.
35 ELSTER 2000: 380.
36 ELSTER 2000: 392. 
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in their own self-interest, “to ground their claims in principle”. On the 
other hand “bargainers often try to present their threats as warnings”37. 
The difference between threats and warnings would lie in the fact that 
the former “are statements about what the speaker will do”, whereas the 
latter are “statements about what will (or may) happen, independently of 
any actions taken by the speaker”38. In the former case, “self-interested 
actors” appeal to an impartial equivalent. In the latter case, bargainers 
substitute a factual equivalent of a threat.
From the point of view of arguing, what happens in reality is not 
actually a “perfect fit between partial interest and impartial arguments” 
but a “maximal fit”39. The reasons for this substitution between partisan 
arguments and impartial arguments may vary. First, “if others believe 
that one is truly arguing from principle, they may be more willing to 
back down”. Second, “legislative coalitions tend to use public-regarding 
language as a ‘subterfuge’ for what is in reality a deal among special 
interests”40. Third, “by citing a general reason one might actually be 
able to persuade others”41.
In any case, thanks to the civilizing force of hypocrisy, arguing 
“tends to yield more equitable outcomes than bargaining”, even when 
it is purely strategic and based on self-interest, because it will prevent 
“the strong from using their bargaining power to the hilt”. In this case, 
“the optimal impartial equivalent”, able to “yield more equitable out-
comes”, will be the one that “dilutes” the self-interest of the strong by 
“taking some account of the interest of the weak”42.
B) Elster believes that “the most important requirement” of a bar-
gaining theory should be “that we are able to specify what will happen 
during a temporary breakdown of cooperation”43. In short, how the con-
stituents can get out of an impasse caused by a non-cooperative – even 
37 ELSTER 2000: 405–406.
38 ELSTER 2000: 415.
39 ELSTER 2000: 406.
40 ELSTER 2000: 408.
41 ELSTER 2000: 408.
42 ELSTER 2000: 413.
43 ELSTER 2000: 398.
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if temporary – situation. An example is the debate which led to the final 
version of Article 29 of the Constitution44.
It is known that this article was the result of a difficult writing pro-
cess that significantly affected its text (and its subsequent interpretations). 
This is due, on the one hand, to the relevance of the topics (family and 
marriage) for the members of the DC Party and, in general more for 
Catholics, and on the other, to the difficult position of the Communist 
Party, which was not willing to be confined to markedly secular positions 
in view of the future political election (in which Catholic votes would 
have been critical) and could not ignore that a significant portion of its 
electorate (and PCI members) held positions very similar to DC Party 
members on some aspects of the matter, and divorce in particular.
The drafting of Article 29 was marked by a series of “temporary 
breakdowns of cooperation” that were overcome through exchanges of 
concessions, recourse to “intra-political” resources (for example a stra-
tegic placement of available votes of a certain parliamentary group) and 
the strategic use of procedures. A first impasse caused by the opposing 
positions of the sub-committee on the indissolubility of marriage and 
the definition of family as a “natural and fundamental unit of society” 
was overcome by Moro and Togliatti through an exchange of conces-
sions which translated into a new version that divided the theme into two 
articles, included a (more ambiguous) definition of “natural society” in 
the article on the family and a (more vague) reference to “unity” (in lieu 
of indissolubility) in the article on marriage. The second breakdown of 
cooperation occurred because of Togliatti and the PCI members’ failure 
to take strategic recourse to the “intra-political” resource of voting. In 
the Constitutional Committee, in keeping with the compromise reached 
with Moro, Togliatti led his group to approve the formula “family as nat-
ural society”. However, when the vote was cast for the second article, 
the amendments against the clause of “indissolubility of marriage” were 
44 CAPORRELLA 2010. The documents of the Constituent Assembly are available 
online in the “Previous legislatures” section of the website of the Lower House 
(“Constituent Assembly” section) or on the “Birth of the Constitution” website, by 
Fabrizio Calzaretti: www.nascitacostituzione.it. The debates leading to the final 
drafting of Article 29 were held on 26 July, 13 September, 30 October, 5–7, 12–13 
and 15 November 1946 and 15 January 1947, as concerns the I Sub-committee; 
4–8, 10–11 and 17 March, 15, 17–19, 21–24 April 1947, as concerns the Assembly.
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not approved. Therefore, the result could be re-balanced only in the last 
voting session through the strategic use of the Assembly’s procedures. 
The request for secret voting by twenty Assembly members allowed the 
compromise to be re-established, leading to the approval by three votes of 
an amendment by Socialist Party member Grilli to remove the reference 
to “indissolubility”. As for bargaining and the recourse to warnings, it is 
interesting to consider the speech by Lelio Basso in the 7 November 1946 
session of the I Sub-committee, during which the Socialist Party member 
warned that the “categorical request for the indissolubility of marriage” 
might have “led to a break-up of the Sub-committee”.
As concerns the arguments used, the trend was not so much to 
argue on principles, but to present consequentialist arguments. In both 
cases, the objective was to present a general and impartial point of view. 
This is especially clear in the speeches by DC Party framers, whose 
main concern was to prove that the need for inclusion of “indissolu-
bility” in the constitutional text went beyond compliance with certain 
religious principles. Corsanego declared that “the authentic Italian pop-
ulation, even in its humbler classes, has clear, well-defined and tangible 
arguments” on the family, recalling the authority of “common sense”. 
He also resorted to a consequentialist argument, noting that “divorce 
represents the dissolution of the family and a poisonous germ for its 
establishment, as is proved in all the countries where it is accepted”. La 
Pira also claimed to insist on permanence because he had been persuad-
ed by “an increasingly determined confirmation in the scientific field of 
the indissolubility of marriage considered as a structural element of the 
family”. He then stressed that the DC Party members wanted to include 
indissolubility in the Constitution because it should concern marriage 
as such, and not as a sacrament (hence, also civil marriage). Thus, he 
considered important “to overcome the question of the parties, so that 
the claim made is not the claim of the DC Party, but of the entire Italian 
population”.
The intention of the DC Party members to present a theme from 
an impartial point of view is clear. Such a theme, they admitted, was 
essential for their political and religious position. The position of those 
opposing inclusion of the phrase “natural society” with respect to the 
family in the Constitution, and those opposing the introduction of 
the indissolubility of marriage appeared more delicate. Following the 
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compromise between Moro and Togliatti, the PCI Party members op-
posed the latter but not the former. On the other hand, the Socialists and 
some Liberals opposed both. However, neither the Socialists nor Togli-
atti posed the question of divorce. In a way, because of the necessary 
tactic in view of the future election, the position of the left-wing parties 
appeared more “defensive” and ambiguous, which exposed them to the 
accusation of inconsistency and opportunism.
Concerning the “exchange of concessions” between Moro and To-
gliatti, we should note the recourse to the strategic use of ambiguity, 
which allowed for an agreement on a formulation sufficiently ambigu-
ous to provide different interpretations that were more or less directly 
consistent with the actors’ different points of view. For Moro, keeping 
the expression “natural society” in the article allowed him to overcome 
a merely confessional position and affirm the “natural rights” of the 
family, while the definition of “natural society” had no legal effect for 
Togliatti and did not imply per se the conclusions that La Pira wanted to 
draw (i.e. “the indissolubility of the bond”).
9. Modes of ratification 
A) The modes of ratification – Elster states – are necessary to confer 
“downstream” legitimacy on the constitutional document approved by 
the constituent assembly.
The following possible modes can be identified45:
– right of veto of the independent convening authority (but how can a 
constituted power influence the constituent power?)
– ratification by the people through referendum or an ad hoc convention
– no additional ratification to the final vote of the constituent assembly.
B) In the Italian case, the approval by the Constituent Assembly was 
sufficient. However, it should be considered that there had already been 
45 ELSTER 2000: 371.
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popular involvement because of the institutional referendum in whose 
wake the Constituent Assembly operated.
10. Conclusion
As concerns the execution of the constituent proceedings, we can say 
that the Elster diagram shows actual endurance capacity as applied to 
the Italian constituent process. Some steps may be overestimated (such 
as the verification of delegates’ credentials), others underestimated (like 
the definition of the assembly’s powers). However, as a whole, the steps 
appear to match and the most critical profiles identified by the Norwe-
gian scholar are present in the Italian case.
The conclusion from the arguing theory perspective appears more 
critical. The analysis of the debate on Article 29 highlights some weak-
nesses of Elster’s model. The first is the role played by rhetoric and 
more generally the concept of rhetoric he refers to. The second problem 
is the articulation of the debates according to the arguing/bargaining 
opposition and the analytical utility of such an opposition. A third prob-
lem could be the strategic use of ambiguity. As concerns the latter two, 
we can supplement Elster’s model with analytical instruments from ar-
guing theory and bargaining theory. 
Qualifying bargaining and arguing as “types of dialogue” appears 
to provide a better description of their characteristics and especially 
their co-presence within the same dialectic interactions through the 
concept introduced by Walton of the “dialectical shift”. In this case, 
it is not just a “combination” of types of dialogue but a more-or-less 
gradual transition from one type of dialogue to the next. It may be a 
legal or illegal transition, and in the first case, the second type of dia-
logue is included in the first, thereby further developing, constructively, 
a dialectical shift46. Thus, bargaining can be transformed (more or less 
accidentally) into a persuasive dialogue. These transitions then make it 
 
46 WALTON 1992: 138 and MACAGNO 2011: 106.
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possible to assess the context within which a certain argument may be 
fallacious or not, replacing a rigid concept of fallacy with a dynamic 
one linked to the use of an argument in a set type of dialogue. Consid-
ering the Elster concept of bargaining, for example, and the central role 
played by threats or warnings within it, it may be interesting to recall 
Walton’s analysis of the argument ad baculum, according to which the 
criterion distinguishing between a fallacious and a non-fallacious use 
of the threat is exactly the type of dialogue since it may be legitimate in 
bargaining but not in a persuasive dialogue47.
Strategic use of ambiguity plays a key role in overcoming “tempo-
rary breakdowns of cooperation”. As Eric M. Eisenberg noted, strategic 
ambiguity favours agreement on an abstraction without committing the 
bargainers on their potential future interpretations48. This is even more 
important when considering that arguers (or bargainers) in a deliberative 
setting may have multiple objectives, some of which may even be (partly) 
contrasting. One can see that this is very similar to what Cass Sunstein de-
fined as “incompletely theorised agreements”49 in a juridical setting, i.e. a 
communicative strategy that does not minimize but manages ambiguity50.
The role of rhetoric remains to be defined. Elster’s dyadic model 
appears to be a triadic model, which is missing a component: “rhetori-
cal statements aiming at persuasion”. This is because Elster considers 
the term “rhetoric” to essentially have a negative meaning, i.e. the com-
mon meaning of manipulation, appeal to passions (and not to reason) 
and demagogy. However, it is reductive to confine rhetoric to a sheer 
appeal to passions because it is actually the reference theoretical frame-
work of any persuasive discourse. In a deliberative setting, the persua-
sive purpose combines both arguing and bargaining and eventually the 
appeal to emotions. As a technique of persuasive discourse, rhetoric 
expands its scope well beyond a mere appeal to the audience’s passions. 
The point is not even the strategic use of arguments but, more generally, 
strategic arguing as a discourse technique whose purpose is to persuade 
 
47 WALTON, MACAGNO 2007: 75. More in general on the topic, see WALTON 
2002.
48 EISENBERG 1984: 231.
49 SUNSTEIN 2007.
50 EISENBERG 1984: 238.
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the audience. Therefore, Elster’s hierarchy should be overturned since 
both strategic arguments and bargaining could develop in a deliberative 
framework and resort to persuasive (rhetorical) discourses. 
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